The year is 2000. Planes haven’t fallen from the air, but people sure seem to be tumbling as the Indiana Pacers are facing the Los Angeles Lakers in the Finals. In Game 2, the Pacers’ starting Center Dale Davis fouls out. Backup center Sam Perkins fouls out. Third-string center Zan Tabak adds three fouls of his own in under three minutes. Meanwhile, Shaquille O’Neal enjoys 40 points and 39 attempted free throws. It was a good thing the Pacers had so many bigs; teams built differently when they knew there was a chance of facing O’Neal.
We’ve seen the same with the current Western Conference teams planning for Nikola Jokic. The Minnesota Timberwolves tried pairing Karl-Anthony Towns and Rudy Gobert for a time. The Oklahoma City Thunder combined Chet Holmgren and Isaiah Hartenstein. The presence of dominant centers alters team-building within their conferences.
Unless you’re the Golden State Warriors.
After trading for Jimmy Butler, and Draymond Green declaring the Warriors are going to win the championship, the former champs are looking to recapture the throne. Yet they are left thin at the center spot. Thin at a spot that is supposed to be a bulwark with Jokic terrorizing the league.
The trio of Kevon Looney, Trayce Jackson-Davis, and Quinten Post constitute Golden State’s stable of centers. A pessimist might say that Looney is a workhorse averaging five points per game whose best years are in the rearview, while Jackson-Davis and Post are too young and untried. Perhaps the playoffs will prove those crass criticisms true.
But it is clear that Golden State has invested less into its center position than almost any other team in the league. The trio will combine to earn just under $12.5 million this season, while 24 of the other 29 teams roster a single center who makes more money than the three combined. None of the three averages 20 minutes or 10 points a game. Relative to the rest of the league, the Warriors are ignoring one position.
In many ways, this has been how the Warriors have built their dynasty. In Golden State’s four championships during the Curry era, the four starting centers have been Andrew Bogut, Zaza Pachulia, Pachulia again (though they started small in the playoffs in 2017-18), and Looney. None of Bogut, Pachulia, or Looney averaged more than 6.3 points a game during those championship seasons or playoffs. So there’s a pedigree here. Or, you know, a lack of one. It wasn’t centers playing center that drove those championships, but Green manning the spot.
The Warriors have only played the Denver Nuggets once so far this season, and it was without Green. Though Looney and Jackson-Davis were both in the rotation, Jokic went wild, scoring 38 points in a win. For three quarters, Looney and Jackson-Davis defended well, forcing Jokic mostly into jumpers and warding him away from the paint. Looney even stripped him on a spin at one point. But then Jokic went berserk in the fourth, scoring 15 points on seven shots, looking unbothered by Golden State’s defense. Denver won.
Would it be different with Green playing? That’s what the Warriors would have pointed to in past years. But those former championship teams were mostly powered by talent advantages. Even with Butler and Curry, are the Warriors more talented than the Nuggets or the Thunder? That’s where real contribution from the centers comes into play. If Golden State is going to win another chip, it will need more from its centers than it ever got in the past.
Are they ready?
Fortunately for the Warriors, all three of their centers fulfill different roles. Jackson-Davis is a classic rim-running threat. He gets up high and throws the ball down. A lot. His 94 dunks on the season ranks 11th in the league, and second, third, and fourth place on the Warriors all combine for 94. His dunks don’t usually come via lobs, but when he slips out of picks or handoffs, catches in the short roll after both defenders in the pick and roll go with Curry, or cuts off of split cuts. If he catches fifteen feet from the rim with a runway, he’s going to throw it down.
Meanwhile, Post is a marksman, hitting 40.8 percent of his triples on the season, first on the Warriors (who, of course, employ Curry). Post and driving maven Butler have a net rating of plus-17.1, as Butler’s physicality is unlocked by Post’s spacing. Possessions that see an on-ball pick (1.07 points per chance) or a dribble hand-off pick (0.94 points per chance) from Post are more efficient than picks or dribble hand-off screens involving either Looney or Jackson-Davis.
He pops on almost 11 picks per 100 possessions, which is why he’s attempting more than three-quarters of his triples from above the break, which stretches defences further than corner triples and provides wider driving lanes for teammates.
Looney is more of a bruising screener, doing his work with physicality and angles at the level of the screen. He’s not a gifted athlete like Jackson-Davis or a shooter like Post, but he sets stronger screens, creating space in that way for his teammates — and thus for himself as he rolls. Spacing comes in many shapes and sizes.
So the Warriors employ a screener who prefers to slip for his own scoring, another who prefers to pop and form his spacing around teammates’ drives, and a final one who sets brick-wall screens and holds them. And as a result, they’re effective in different situations.
Post is developing real chemistry with bench units. His shooting offers more bang for its buck than it does with the starters — as Green is generally the one with whom Curry runs pick and roll, rather than Post. The trio of Post with Brandon Podziemski and Moses Moody has a silly net rating of plus-40.7 (in a very tiny sample of 72 minutes). But beyond the numbers, the product there looks successful. Those transitional units move and cut and pass and drive and generally increase the pace of actions from the (already quite hectic) mark set by Curry-led groups. The above trio featuring Butler have thrashed opponents by an even wider margin.
Looney’s defense has, as always, remained a huge factor. He doesn’t generate events, such as steals or blocks, but he remains strong at forcing misses around the rim. He’s holding opponents to sub-50 percent accuracy within six feet, while both Jackson-Davis and Post allow approximately 60 percent while defending such shots. Looney’s mark is actually the third-best in the league among players to have appeared in at least 10 games and defended at least 30 shots from within six feet. He has strong verticality, long arms, and enough strength to hold his ground through contact.
Add it all together, and Post is something of an offensive specialist, Looney a defensive specialist, and Jackson-Davis a generalist (by being more or less neutral in both categories). It has been hard for Steve Kerr to find minutes for all three in the rotation, with Post not seeing minutes early, and one of Looney or Jackson-Davis often sitting since Post joined the rotation in late January. Since Golden State’ trading for Butler, Jackson-Davis has largely only seen garbage-time minutes. But the Warriors have a variety of clubs in the bag.
Will versatility be enough? Talent matters more. And arguably, weaknesses influence results to a greater extent than strengths in the playoffs, and all three players have real weaknesses. Post’s defense doesn’t affect too many plays, as he’s neither strong enough to hold his ground in the paint nor active enough to be early to plays. Looney’s offence is a negative at this point, as defenses ignore him with relative safety. Jackson-Davis offensively doesn’t create much for others with his screening, as his slips and ghosts generally are meant to serve his own scoring. And defensively, though he’s not as statistically negative as Post, he still isn’t cleaning up teammates’ messes.
The Warriors have been better with Looney on the court this season, and worse with either of the other two playing, so perhaps he remains the team’s answer. The last time (2023) the Warriors were in the playoffs, Looney led the team in net rating and was third in the entire league in rebounds per game. But the Warriors lost in those playoffs to a dominant center in Anthony Davis, whom the Warriors couldn’t force to miss and couldn’t keep off the glass (he led the playoffs in rebounding, averaging 14.5 per game against Golden State). Furthermore, 2025’s Looney does not move like 2023’s Looney. If the Warriors were not ready to beat big-man dominance in 2023, it’s hard to argue that much has changed.
Going small has always been Golden State’s secret weapon, and it will remain the Warriors’ back-against-the-wall, last-stand option. When Green plays without a center alongside him, the Warriors this season have had a point differential per 100 possessions of plus-10.8. With Curry also playing, it’s plus-16.7. That’s right in line with Golden State’s regular-season marks of Curry-Green-no center from its championship seasons in 2022 (plus-16.6), and 2017 (plus-12.4) — though a bit off from 2018 (plus-25.6) and 2015 (plus-28.1). The Warriors still have their fastball, which has never included a center.
But if Golden State is trying to overcome a deficit every time it moves Green to center, rather than building upon a lead, that’s a recipe for failure in this turbocharged West. Yet eschewing centers almost entirely and starting Green as the lone big would invite a physical mauling over a marathon playoff series. It’s clear that Kerr knows a solution must be found, as the team’s starting center position has been in flux — though it appears Kerr might have settled on starting small with Green — since Butler came on board.
Perhaps Post pops into a niche star-in-his-role situation. Or Looney channels his soul-devouring performance from the 2022 playoffs. But at least one of Golden State’s centers has to have a revelatory playoff run. Many things have changed for the Warriors over the course of their dynasty. Butler is in, Klay Thompson and Kevin Durant are out. But just as shocking, if in a much quieter way, is that the team is now — for the first time — relying on its centers to be much more than placeholders.
