On November 4, 2025, UPS Airlines Flight 2976 took off from Muhammad Ali International Airport in Louisville, Kentucky, headed to Honolulu, Hawaii. Tragically, it didn’t make it, as a fire on the left wing caused it to crash after takeoff, causing a fiery explosion that killed 14 people and injured 23 others. Now, nearly three weeks later, the National Transportation Safety Board has released its preliminary report on the crash, and it’s blaming a cracked engine mount. Or, to use the exact wording found in the report:
After initial cleaning of the fracture surfaces, examination of the left pylon aft mount lug fractures found evidence of fatigue cracks in addition to areas of overstress failure. On the aft lug, on both the inboard and outboard fracture surfaces, a fatigue crack was observed where the aft lug bore met the aft lug forward face. For the forward lug’s inboard fracture surface, fatigue cracks were observed along the lug bore. For the forward lug’s outboard fracture surface, the fracture consisted entirely of overstress with no indications of fatigue cracking. The forward top flange of the aft mount assembly was examined for indications of deformation or pre-existing fractures, but no indications were found.
The report also included a series of still images from an airport surveillance video that you can see here, showing the engine and pylon breaking apart and separating from the left wing as the fire in the engine spreads. The NTSB also reported that the pilot had 4,918 hours flying MD-11s and 8,613 total hours of flight experience, while the First Officer had 994 hours flying MD-11s and 9,200 total hours of flight experience, and the Relief Officer had 8,775 hours flying MD-11s and 15,250 total hours of flight experience. Investigators managed to recover the flight recorders, as well.
Scheduled maintenance performed
Considering that investigators found cracks in the left engine mount, you might assume UPS got behind on maintenance, or the crew missed something it shouldn’t have missed. But at least based on what the NTSB found in its initial report, it doesn’t sound like that was the case:
At the time of the accident, N259UP had accumulated a total time of about 92,992 hours and 21,043 cycles. The accident airplane was maintained under a continuous airworthiness maintenance program (CAMP). A review of the inspection tasks for the left pylon aft mount found both a general visual inspection (GVI) and a detailed visual inspection of the left pylon aft mount, required by UPS’s maintenance program at a 72-month interval, was last accomplished on October 28, 2021. A 24-month/4,800 hour lubrication task of the pylon thrust links and pylon spherical bearings was last accomplished on October 18, 2025. A special detailed inspection (SDI) of the left pylon aft mount lugs would have been due at 29,200 cycles and of the left wing clevis support would have been due at 28,000 cycles. The accident airplane records showed these two SDI tasks had not been accomplished (the airplane had 21,043 cycles).
With close to 7,000 more takeoffs left before another inspection was due, it sounds like UPS didn’t do anything wrong based on the maintenance schedule it received from McDonnell Douglas. Which, of course, raises the question of whether or not McDonnell Douglas’s maintenance schedule is too lax. After all, if UPS was performing all the necessary checks as directed by the manufacturer, and it still missed those cracks, shouldn’t the MD-11 require more frequent inspections?
Unfortunately for all of us, that particular issue will probably take far too long to litigate, but at the very least, the Federal Aviation Administration banned all MD-11s from flying until they could be properly inspected. That order was then expanded to include all DC-10 series airplanes, since they’re so similar to the MD-11.
