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HomeDroneAirprox 2024294 – What Actually Happened? – sUAS News

Airprox 2024294 – What Actually Happened? – sUAS News


Airprox 2024294 – What Actually Happened?

On the night of 22 November 2024 at 21:51 UTC, a National Police Air Service (NPAS) EC135 helicopter operating near RAF Lakenheath reported multiple “drones” manoeuvring around it. In reality, the objects were USAF F15 fighters engaged in authorised night training in Class G airspace (surface–FL150), coordinated by Lakenheath Approach (“Overlord”).

Summary of Key Facts:

  • Closest Point of Approach (CPA): 1 NM horizontal / 1900 ft vertical separation (recorded).
  • ATC Services:
    • EC135 – Basic Service (no traffic information guaranteed).
    • F-15s – Traffic Service (received information about the EC135).
  • Misidentification Factors:
    • EC135’s TCAS did not display the F-15s.
    • F-15 lighting did not resemble standard civil aircraft lighting.
    • The crew believed the lights were drones due to their apparent behaviour and lack of TCAS confirmation.

The UK Airprox Board (UKAB) concluded that there was no risk of collision (Risk Category E) and attributed the report to misidentification and situational awareness breakdown rather than unsafe flying.


Why This Matters to Drone Operators

1. Misidentification Risk

Even experienced police aircrew using EO/IR cameras mistook military jets for drones. This shows how easily drone operators can be blamed for aerial events they weren’t involved in.

2. Electronic Conspicuity Limitations

The EC135’s TCAS did not detect the F-15s despite them squawking Modes A and C. This highlights the ongoing limitations of EC systems in complex or mixed-use airspace, particularly at night.

3. ATC Service Levels – Know the Difference

Under a Basic Service, ATC is not required to provide traffic information. Drone operators should consider requesting a Traffic Service or Deconfliction Service for BVLOS, urban, or sensitive operations.


Public Perception: A Persistent Challenge

  • “Drone blame” is the default: Unidentified lights in the sky are often assumed to be drones, fuelling public concern and regulatory overreaction.
  • Poor understanding of airspace rules: The public often assumes ATC sees and controls everything — which is untrue in Class G.
  • Coordination gaps: The police helicopter tasking was not pre-notified to the USAF. This shows the need for better operational coordination.

Risk Assessment for UK Drone Operations

Potential Scenarios and Risk Levels:

  • Misidentification by other aircraft:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Severity: Low to Medium
    • Risk Level: Moderate overall, but High reputationally
  • No traffic info under Basic Service:
    • Likelihood: Medium
    • Severity: Medium
    • Risk Level: Moderate
  • Public/media backlash from perceived near-miss:
    • Likelihood: High
    • Severity: High
    • Risk Level: High (especially for commercial operators)

Key Mitigations for Drone Operators:

  • Use dual EC systems (ADS-B OUT and ground-based detect-and-avoid).
  • Maintain a telemetry and flight log archive for every operation.
  • Pre-notify military ATC when operating near MOD airspace.
  • File CANPs, NOTAMs, or Temporary Danger Areas when applicable.
  • Train pilots to request an upgrade to Traffic Service where required.

Legal and Regulatory Observations

  • SERA.3205 and ANO Article 239 set the standard for proximity liability. Keep compliance well-documented.
  • Expect growing pressure for mandatory electronic conspicuity, with incidents like this cited in policy.
  • If blamed in media or police statements without evidence, drone operators may have grounds for defamation or economic loss claims. Get legal advice promptly.

Final Thoughts

This wasn’t a drone incident — but it could have been perceived as one.

The lesson? Control the narrative by controlling the data.
Record everything. Secure it. Share it when necessary. With the right evidence, drone operators can protect themselves from false blame and help improve UK airspace safety.


About the Author

Richard Ryan is a UK barrister and aviation lawyer specialising in drone regulation, UAS integration, and counter-drone law. A Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators, he advises police forces, government bodies, and commercial operators on airspace compliance and emerging UTM frameworks. He is also completing a PhD on airspace integration and unmanned traffic management at Cranfield University.


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