Unauthorized drone activity over US military installations and sensitive sites has emerged as a significant and complex threat to national security in recent years. What were once perceived as potential issues with hobbyists have revealed themselves to be part of a coordinated effort by adversaries to collect valuable intelligence and surveillance on sensitive military equipment. These incursions are often designed to disrupt important training and create chaos.
The scale of the problem is concerning. In the past year alone, the commander of NORAD and Northcom testified to Congress that there were over 350 detections of drones at 100 different military installations. This means 350 potential national security breaches at highly sensitive sites, including nuclear facilities and major military bases. The Department of Defense estimated there are over 8,500 drones flown legally across the country every day, with more than 1 million registered in the US in 2024. This sheer volume makes identifying nefarious activity challenging.
These incidents are not isolated. A notable example occurred at Langley Air Force Base in December 2023, where unidentified drones repeatedly breached sensitive military airspace over 17 days. This was described as the longest and largest series of incursions seen to date. During this incident, F-22 Raptor squadrons had to be moved to alternate bases, and discussions were initiated on installing physical countermeasures. Another incident saw hundreds of drones spotted over New Jersey and other parts of the Northeast. While later revealed to be authorised by the FAA, the initial confusion and lack of answers highlighted systemic issues. Subsequent incursions have also occurred over locations like Plant 42 in Palmdale, California, and Pikatiny Arsenal and Naval Weapons Station Earl in New Jersey.
The current framework for addressing this threat is described as complex and “patched together”. Multiple agencies are involved, including the Department of Defense (DoD), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Intelligence Community, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security. There is currently no single agency with primary authority on countering drone incursions, leading to confusion and critical gaps. This inter-agency failure was evident during the New Jersey incident.
Base commanders face significant challenges in responding effectively:
- Inadequate or non-existent monitoring capabilities. Capabilities vary greatly from base to base, and it is not comprehensive or sufficient.
- A near total lack of counter-drone capabilities.
- Unclear standard operating procedures (SOPs) to guide responses and decision-making. While a new SOP has been published by Commander US Northern Command within the last month, its implementation and effectiveness across all bases are ongoing.
- Ambiguous legal authorities, both on and off base.
The legal authorities are a major sticking point. Under current US law, only specific agencies (DoE, DoJ, DoD, DHS) are allowed to detect and respond to drone activities in certain situations, such as around nuclear facilities or missile defence assets. However, only about half of all military installations currently fall under this definition of a “covered facility”. For instance, Luke Air Force Base, where significant F-35 training occurs, is not a covered facility because training facilities are not included in the criteria.
For facilities that are not “covered,” responding to a drone incursion relies on the standard rules of engagement and rules for the use of force. This typically requires establishing “hostile intent or hostile act”. Discerning whether an unauthorized drone represents negligent activity by a hobbyist or commercial user, or is conducting surveillance for an adversary, can be very challenging in the homeland.
Section 13i authorities provide additional room to respond for covered facilities, allowing action if a drone is conducting or suspected of conducting unauthorized surveillance or interfering with operations, without necessarily needing to establish hostile intent. This standard is considered preferable as it relieves some of the burden on the base commander.
Coordination with state and local law enforcement is crucial for addressing drone activity occurring off-base, as base commanders lack the authority to detain individuals outside the base perimeter. Building strong relationships with local law enforcement is part of base commander training, and cooperation does occur, as seen at Joint Base Langley Eustis.
Beyond legal and procedural issues, there are significant technological gaps. While technologies exist to detect and track drones, fielding effective counter-drone systems is challenging. The technology for drone application (commercial, recreational) has far outpaced the technology to defeat them. Counter-drone technology is primarily driven by demand from agencies like the DoD, DHS, and law enforcement. Available technologies include jamming, disrupting, and even taking over hostile drones, but further development is needed. There is no single “silver bullet” technology.
The DoD is working to address these gaps through initiatives like the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRACK), the Joint Counter UAS Office, and the Defense Innovation Unit (DIU) to rapidly acquire new capabilities. Developing and fielding “domain awareness sensors” to track drones is seen as a critical first step, alongside methods for command and control and building a common operating picture by fusing data from different sensor types. Additional investment is needed for response capabilities. Flyaway kits are being developed to provide limited detection capability to bases lacking it.
Unauthorized drone activity, even if negligent, diverts critical security resources. Public messaging about responsible drone use is seen as important to prevent such diversions.
An increasing concern is the coupling of Artificial Intelligence (AI) with drone technology. AI enables autonomous navigation, obstacle avoidance, computer vision, target identification, and makes weaponization easier, potentially leading to an exponentially increased threat. Policy needs to adapt rapidly to keep pace with these advancements.
The DoD is seeking legislative refinements to their counter-UAS authorities under Section 13i. Proposed changes include:
- Preventing the provision from sunsetting (expiring) next year.
- Expanding the locations and missions covered under 13i to include all installations, not just the current nine mission areas.
- Facilitating data sharing with inter-agency partners beyond just legal cases, to improve tactics and procedures and drive cost efficiencies.
There is a strong push for a greater sense of urgency in addressing this threat, particularly given that bad actors, including foreign adversaries like China and Iran, are believed to exploit existing weaknesses and jurisdictional confusion. Two Chinese nationals have already been arrested for illegally flying drones over military installations for surveillance since 2023. Some argue that bureaucracy and a fear of legal repercussions (like being prosecuted for shooting down private property) are preventing necessary action by commanders. One suggested legislative change is to modify 18 USC 32, which currently treats remote-controlled drones like passenger airplanes, by changing the word “aircraft” to “manned aircraft” to clarify rules around engaging drones.
Ultimately, addressing the threat requires a “whole of government approach and a unified effort”. This involves modernising the ability to assess threats, determine weaknesses, and acquire and deploy countermeasures. Congress is seen as needing to act to provide necessary authorities, appropriations, and oversight, although navigating the complex legislative landscape involving multiple committees is a challenge.
In conclusion, unauthorized drone activity over US military installations is a potent, evolving threat that demands urgent attention. While the DoD is taking steps to improve capabilities and processes, significant hurdles remain, particularly concerning legal authorities, technology gaps, and inter-agency coordination. Enhanced domain awareness, streamlined authorities, rapid acquisition of counter-drone technology, and stronger partnerships at all levels are critical to securing the skies above America’s sensitive sites.
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